tacks in Europe and stateside in Orlando, Florida. 11 However, the essential Islamophobic message underlying the bombast of Trump, or the rhetoric of Ted Cruz, 12 are rooted in earlier, significant, and distinctly American legal and political pronouncements. The Islamophobia rising to the fore during the 2016 presidential campaign was not created by the candidates; rather, it was embedded in established American law, policies, and political rhetoric. Furthermore, this Islamophobia was emboldened by the fear and animus of Muslims driving modern counterterror programs.
Broadly defined, Islamophobia is ''the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and unassimilable . . . and the belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism. '' 13 Rooted in established tropes and mischaracterizations of Muslims and Islam, Islamophobia is undergirded by the theory of ''Orientalism,'' 14 a master discourse that positions Islam------as a faith, people, and imagined geographic sphere------as the civilizational foil of the West. 15 These bodies of misrepresentations and mischaracterizations feed the images, ideas, and ideologies about Islam and Muslims, thereby feeding the blatant Islamophobia that rose to the fore during the 2016 presidential campaign.
Islamophobia, which began to take form as a recognizable phrase and distinct form of bigotry following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, was materially driven by the discursive, political, and legal ''redeployment of . . . Orientalist tropes'' that followed. 16 Thus, while ''Islamophobia'' became prominent in political discourse after 9/11, 17 it is firmly rooted in 
REV. ONLINE 108 (2016) [hereinafter Toward a Legal Definition and Framework]
(providing a theoretical definition and framework for understanding Islamophobia as both a process and a private and structural animus).
13. Id. at 111. 14. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books ed. 1979) (coining and framing the theory of Orientalism, which positions the West, or ''Occident,'' as the superior counterpoint and antithesis of the inferior Middle East, or ''Orient'').
15. Islam is viewed as both religion and race through the Orientalist and Islamophobic lens, understood in the narrow image of Arabs. See generally Beydoun, Between Muslim and White, supra note 8.
16. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1586 (2002) .
17. An influential study published by the Center for American Progress in 2011 mainstreamed the term in media, scholarly, and political circles. WAJAHAT ALI ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, the images, ideas, and epistemology of its precedent system, Orientalism. 18 Extending the Orientalism framework, Islamophobia is based upon the beliefs that Islam is a hostile faith, and that Muslims------even while citizens------are a foreign, violent, and unassimilable people. 19 In addition, Islamophobia undermines the normalization of Muslims and disables the perception of them as anything more than inherently suspicious or threatening. 20 These ideas, seeded by formative laws and judicial rulings and later endorsed by modern state policy, intensely rose to the fore of American society after 9/11, and are still here today:
We are witnessing the redeployment of old Orientalist tropes. Historically, Asia and the Middle East have functioned as phantasmic sites on which the U.S. nation projects a series of anxieties regarding internal and external threats to the coherence of the national body. The national identity of the United States has been constructed in opposition to those categorized as ''foreigners,'' ''aliens,'' and ''others.'' 20. Islamophobia's most resilient quality, perhaps, is the systematic redeployment of the Muslim villain image and erasure of the Muslim victim. See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslims in the News Only When They're Behind the Gun, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/ indepth/opinion/2015/01/muslims-france-charlie-hebdo-me-201518121649556792.html (focusing on the murder of Ahmed Merabat, a policeman on site of the Charlie Hebdo attack). This dialectic plays out perpetually today, as evidenced by both national and international crises that involve a Muslim culprit or are swiftly presumed to involve one. See id.
21. Volpp, supra note 16, at 1586 (footnote omitted). UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 Thus, Islamophobia collectively and collaterally affects all Muslims------as well as non-Muslims. 22 As illustrated by the brash rhetoric evident in the 2016 presidential campaign, it also acutely impacts and stigmatizes America's eight million Muslim citizens, 23 particularly Muslims living in concentrated and cognizable ''Muslim American'' communities. 24 Like other forms of bigotry, ''Islamophobia is not fixed or static.'' Rather, ''Islamophobia is a fluid and dynamic system whereby lay actors and law enforcement target Muslim Americans based on irrational fear and hatred.'' 25 Islamophobia is, on one hand, formal law and policy. It is also, however, political language, campaign platforms, get-out-the-vote tactics, and strategically deployed media sound-bytes from presidential candidates. In line with this articulation of Islamophobia, this Article argues that:
First, Islamophobia is facilitated by formative legal and political baselines------deeply embedded in American legal, media, and political in- 22 . Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, supra note 12, at 123 (''For instance, Sikh American men are typically perceived to be Muslims by private Islamophobes, and consequently, among the most vulnerable and targeted victims of private Islamophobia. Turbaned, bearded, and brownskinned, Sikh men fit the stereotypical caricature of the 'Muslim terrorist' more closely than the majority of Muslim men, which has led to profiling, hate crimes, and targeted killings of this grouping after terror attacks. In addition, the phenotypic appearance of non-Muslim South Asian, [ In practice, the law and politics of Islamophobia do not unfold on separate tracks. Rather, the dialectic between law and political rhetoric is a synergistic and symbiotic one, whereby the former endorses and emboldens the latter. The expansion of per se, or ''structural, '' 28 Islamophobia spurs anti-Muslim political rhetoric and incites ''private'' animus or violence. 29 Further, this Article argues that political rhetoric is itself, first, an expression of prevailing law, and, second, an aspirational expression of laws candidates vying for the presidency are poised to implement. Therefore, I conclude that the brazen disparaging of Islam and Muslims on the campaign trail is far more than ''mere rhetoric '' 30 : it is an expression of law. It is also a narration of American Islamophobia, ''a central organizing idea or story line'' retold through a modern, ''unfolding strip of events.'' 31 The prevailing storyline justifies Islamophobia by framing it as a necessary step toward countering radicalization, defeating ISIS, or ''protecting American values. '' 32 This Article makes several notable contributions to the legal literature. First, it solidifies a definition of and theory for Islamophobia------instrumental to emergent legal discourses on national security, antiterrorism, and civil liberties amid the protracting ''War on Terror.'' Sec- [ed] . . . in the hope that they will eventually persuade, their more immediate task is, through skillful framing, to leave their opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal.'' Id. at 36. Within the scope of this Article, and the 2016 presidential campaign, the ''opponents'' are the voting public.
28. ''[T]he fear and suspicion of Muslims on the part of institutions------most notably, government agencies------that is manifested through the enactment and advancement of policies. ' 34 and Muslim Americans------followers of the second-largest and fastest-growing faith in the U.S.
35 ------mature in terms of size, diversity, and political influence.
The Article proceeds accordingly. Part II investigates the Naturalization Era------the racially restrictive period from 1790 through 1952------when Muslim immigrants were, for nearly the entire period, banned from becoming naturalized citizens. Part III analyzes the modern law of American Islamophobia, investigating post-9/11 and current policies guided by fear and suspicion of Islam and Muslims. Part IV examines the blatant and latent forms of political Islamophobia, centering on the rhetoric and perspectives permeating political campaigns, media discourses, and formal state policy. Part V argues that the Islamophobia coming from the presidential campaign trail emboldens the ''private Islamophobia'' coming from American citizens. 36 Hateful rhetoric is more than merely language, but words that lead to real wounds inflicted on Muslim American citizens and communities.
II. AMERICA'S FIRST ''MUSLIM BAN''
More than two centuries before a ''Muslim ban'' headlined the New York Times or was breaking news on Fox News, Muslims were statutorily barred from becoming American citizens. From 1790 through 1944, Muslims were deemed alien, inassimilable, and threatening to American society, 37 and were banned from becoming naturalized. The Naturalization Act of 1790, which mandated that naturalized citizens be ordained ''free 33 The statutory and jurisprudential foundations that enabled the ''first Muslim ban'' are discussed below. Section A provides an overview of the Naturalization Act of 1790, the statutory cornerstone of the racially restrictive Naturalization Era. Section B closely examines the primary naturalization cases involving immigrant-petitioners from the Arab world, which cases set forth the longstanding precedent that Islam was not reconcilable with whiteness, thereby making Muslims ineligible for naturalized citizenship.
A. The Naturalization Act of 1790
For the majority of America's existence as a sovereign nation, whiteness and citizenship were legally conflated. In other words, one had to be white to become a naturalized citizen. The Naturalization Act of 1790 codified whiteness as a prerequisite for naturalized citizenship, thereby marking it as the per se dividing line between inclusion and exclusion, and also access to a range of privileges and benefits associated with formal citizenship.
39
Enacted on March 26, 1790, the Naturalization Act defined the legal and racial parameters for naturalization as an American citizen:
That any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any common law court of record in any one of the States wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at least . . . .
40
The Act limited citizenship to immigrants who could convince a court that they fit within the statutory definition of ''free white persons.'' 41 Second, an immigrant could only apply after meeting the two-year residency requirement. 42 The Act was reformed in 1795 and 1798, most notably, extending the residency requirement from two to five years. Immigration law scholar Hiroshi Motomura observes that the Naturalization Act ''entailed no obligation to naturalize, though many immigrants did take that next step and became citizens.'' 44 Fearing a negative ruling, many settlers opted not to take this step toward citizenship. 45 This was especially true for settlers from East and South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and other parts beyond Europe. 46 For these immigrants, living as noncitizen residents, or ''Americans in waiting, '' 47 and flying under the radar until the whiteness mandate was lifted, was preferable to receiving a negative naturalization judgment by a court.
Again, the civil courts were burdened with the task of interpreting the statutory meaning of whiteness. Employing a number of rotating ''racial,'' tests some judges emphasized the importance of physical appearance, framers' intent, the common sense understanding of whiteness, and in the case of immigrants from the Muslim world, religion. 48 Again, whiteness was not merely a race during the Naturalization Era, but a ''material concept imbued with rights and privileges.'' 49 The greatest right, citizenship, was inscribed into it, which, considering the deeply embedded narrative of a rivalry between Orient and Occident, Muslims and Christians, 50 brought forth the functional enactment of a Muslim naturalization ban that stood in place for 164 years.
51

B. Trumping Up ''Muslim Threat''
For the majority of the U.S.'s existence, Muslims were banned from becoming naturalized citizens. 52 The Naturalization Act's mandate of ''whiteness'' as a prerequisite for citizenship compelled Muslims------and immigrants presumed to be Muslims because of their place of origin------to persuade judges that they fit within the statutory definition of whiteprivileges. The racial barrier codified in the Naturalization Act of 1795, however, restricted who could complete a declaration of intent and ''who could take advantage of these ideas and the sort of welcome they implied. ' 58 Thus, Shishim not only invoked that his Christian identity merited a finding of whiteness, but also that his hailing from the very same land as Jesus------Christianity's seminal figure and Son of God 59 ------compelled such a finding. During the proceeding, it appeared that Hutton was skeptical of Shishim's Christian bona fides because of his Lebanese, or Middle Eastern, origins. Shishim's appeal tying his geographic origins to that of Jesus, 53 . In line with the position that race is a social construction, ''Being white is not a monolithic or homogenous experience, either in terms of race, other social identities, space or time. Instead, Whiteness is contingent, changeable, partial, inconstant, and ultimately social.'' HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 48, at xiv. Whiteness, during the Naturalization era, vacillated between narrow and broader constructions, whereby judges subjectively drew upon a range of criteria------eugenics, physical appearance, language, geographic origin, religion, and other factors------to find an immigrant petitioner within or beyond the statutory definition of whiteness. A popular position by courts, illustrated in Ozawa v. United States, held that whiteness was synonymous with Caucasian and confined to persons of the ''Caucasian race,'' but the court used other measures besides ancestry and etymology to define the basis and bounds of whiteness. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) .
54. Antebellum Islam, supra note 38, at 163---68 (analyzing the construction of Muslim identity from a religion into a political and ethnic identity). ''Propaganda arising from the Barbary Wars, combined with Orientalist baselines, cemented the idea that Arab and Muslim identity were one in the same. In other words, Islam------as a religious identity------was converted into a narrow ethno-racial identity that excluded any group that was not believed to be Arabs or Turks. This 'disorientation of Muslim identity,' shaped how American halls of power and society viewed Muslim identity beginning in the late 18th Century and onward.' ' Id. however, rebutted that presumption, leading Hutton to rule that Shishim fit within the statutory definition of whiteness, because he was able to overcome the presumption (or suspicion) that he was Muslim by persuasively demonstrating that he was in fact racially and religiously Christian. 60 Thus, Shishim's twofold demonstration of Christianity (as religion and race) functioned as his pathway toward whiteness and citizenship, thereby enabling him to circumvent the standing Muslim naturalization ban.
For subsequent immigrant petitioners from the Muslim world, Shishim established the precedent that ''performing'' Christianity within the court was the optimal pathway toward whiteness and citizenship. 61 One year later, Costa George Najour overcame the Muslim naturalization ban by demonstrating to a Georgia court that he too was Christian. 62 Subsequently, both a Massachusetts and Oregon court also found a Syrian Christian and Lebanese Christian white by law. 63 In both instances, the presumption of Muslim identity, based on the geographic origins of the petitioners, was overridden by their in-court performance of Christianity, which again was often interpreted by Naturalization Era judges as a hallmark and harbinger of whiteness. 64 However, not every Christian petitioner from the Muslim world overcame the Muslim naturalization ban. One case involving an immigrant petitioner from modern-day Lebanon, Ex parte Shahid, 65 illustrates how Muslim identity was acutely racialized during the Naturalization Era. Shahid asserted his Christian faith to rebut the presumption that he was a Muslim. 66 Judge Smith of the South Carolina court, however, viewed his dark skin as evidence of miscegenation with Muslims. 67 Smith described the immigrant petitioner to be ''about [the color] of a walnut, or somewhat darker than is the usual mulatto of one-half mixed blood between the white and the negro races.'' 68 60. Between Muslim and White, supra note 8, at 33. 61. The Naturalization Law of 1790, immediately upon arrival, compelled immigrants from the Arab World to shed their pre-migration identities, strategize how they fit within this matrix, and ''perform whiteness'' within American courts. Here, I borrow the language of law scholar John Tehranian, who argues that, ''time and again, the privileges of whiteness have been doled out to those who best perform whiteness.'' TERHRANIAN, supra note 49, at 26. John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 839 (2000) (for an examination of how immigrants were tasked with performing whiteness, and persuading judges that they fit within the statutory scheme, to be legally naturalized as American citizens).
62. Prohibitions against the citizenship of Muslims during the ''Naturalization Era'' root modern law and policy that similarly profile Muslims as inassimilable and threatening. 86 Indeed, a close examination of the ''Arab Naturalization Cases'' examined above reveals, 87 in lurid and vivid fashion, that the polemical and bellicose rhetoric emanating from the 2016 presidential campaign is substantively identical to the pronouncements of judges presiding over cases involving immigrant-petitioners from the Muslim world.
Contemporary laws, particularly policy and programming rolled out after 9/11, restricted Muslim immigrants beyond American borders and closely monitored Muslim citizens and communities with them. Both fronts were prompted by structural Islamophobia------''the fear and suspicion of Muslims on the part of institutions, most notably, government agencies, that is manifested through the enactment and advancement of policies. '' 88 Certainly, whenever a domestic terrorist attack takes place in America, many quickly turn to tropes of an ''Islamic menace,'' ''violent foreigner,'' or homegrown terrorist. 89 While these tropes have taken on new forms and frames, they are conceptually and substantively based on formative stereotypes. 90 These very stereotypes underlie the state suspicion of Muslims and Islam that steers modern state counterterror policy. 91 Fear of Islam and Muslims took on prolific proportions after 9/11. Sweeping legislation centering on religious and racial ''profiling, '' 92 combined with structural reform of the government to deal with the height-86. The name of the 162-year period when whiteness was a prerequisite to become a naturalized citizen. For a comprehensive examination of the Naturalization Era and each and every prerequisite case, see generally HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 48.
87. The ten Naturalization Era cases involving an immigrant-petitioner from the Arab/Muslim world are commonly referred to as the ''Arab-Naturalization Cases. ' 92. ''[P]rofiling involves separating a subsection of the population from the larger whole on the basis of specific criteria that purportedly correlates to risk and subjecting the subgroup to special scrutiny for the purposes of preventing violence, crime, or some other undesirable activity. ' ened national-security threat, were instituted after the 9/11 terror attacks. The ''War on Terror'' unleashed after 9/11 continues today, 93 with important statutory and strategic tweaks.
Section A investigates post-9/11 law and policy. Subsequently, Section B analyzes the two most prominent forms of legal American Islamophobia that followed the post-9/11 era: anti-Sharia legislation and ''Countering Violent Extremism'' (''CVE'') Policing.
A. Post 9/11 Policy
State suspicion and systematic surveillance of Muslim Americans commenced well before 9/11. 94 However, because the terrorists were Muslims, 95 the state centered its expanded counterterror programming in the directions of Muslim foreign nationals and citizens. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (''DHS'') on November 25, 2002, 96 electronic surveillance became the strategic cornerstone of the domestic counterterror strategy following the deadliest terror attack in U.S. history.
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In addition to expanded surveillance capacities, the Bush Administration structurally overhauled the state's immigration and nationalsecurity functions around the heightened fear of Muslim threat. The newly minted DHS swallowed up the state's previously standalone immigration, customs, and emergency-management functions; ''DHS consolidated the state's immigration and emigration regimes, and functioned as 94. ''The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (''AEDPA'') was the beginning of policing of Muslim subjects and communities. One part of this legislation led to the disparate investigation of Muslim American political and social activity, while another led to the deportation of Muslims with links -real or fictive -to terrorist activity. ' In the name of national security, The USA PATRIOT Act circumvented the Fourth Amendment to advance the Bush Administration's unprecedented surveillance and religious-profiling programs. 99 In the process, it severely diminished the First and Fourth Amendment rights of Muslim Americans. 100 For the state, monitoring Muslim subjects and spaces, such as mosques or community centers, was an acceptable collateral cost needed to achieve stated national security aims. 101 Yet, DHS's perception of Islam as threatening and Muslims as menacing formed the foundation of the state's War on Terror strategy, extending the Orientalist tropes of the Naturalization Era into the Post-9/11 Era.
In addition to two wars fought abroad, 102 and broadly expanded domestic surveillance and policing at home, the post-9/11 moment witnessed the enactment of a second policy that bore many parallels to the Muslim ban put in place during the Naturalization Era. In June 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (''NSEERS''), a sweeping immigration tracking program that almost exclusively targeted Muslim immigrants, nonimmigrants, and permanent residents. 103 The ''Special Registration'' provision of NSEERS:
Required all male teens and adult nationals of 25 different countries to allow themselves to be fingerprinted and registered by the federal government or be subject to immediate to their home countries. 102. ''[T]he government launched two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Relying on the legitimate uncertainty at the time, lawmakers and media pundits directed the nation's fear of another attack toward Muslims------and those who had physical 'Muslim' characteristics------to convince the public that such measures were both valid and necessary to prevent another terrorist attack. ' While dissolved in 2011, 105 NSEERS explicitly reintegrated the Orientalist baseline that Muslims were presumptive national-security threats. Geographic origins, in addition to race and religion, signaled likelihood of national-security threat.
Again, the Islamophobic laws enacted after 9/11 harvested rife antiMuslim hatred and hysteria on the ground. If government agencies and laws, such as DHS and the PATRIOT Act, deemed Muslim Americans a dangerous ''fifth column,'' 106 then it is only logical that private citizens would follow suit and mimic that violence against a subset of the polity designated as an enemy group.
107
Discrimination and violence toward Muslim Americans, and those stereotyped as such, skyrocketed after 9/11. In the immediate wake of 9/11:
The 113 recent events, state policy, and bigoted political rhetoric, however, indicate otherwise. This climbing Islamophobia, which has reached climactic proportions during the 2016 presidential campaign, did not rise within a vacuum. Rather, it was in great part spurred and stoked by the structural Islamophobia that continued beyond the policies enacted after 9/11. This Section examines the two most prominent forms of structural Islamophobia that emerged after the post-9/11 era. The anti-Sharia legislation brought forth in many states will be examined first, followed by the state's growing fear of Muslim radicalization, manifested by its expanded commitment to CVE Policing. being revitalized in the imminent future is very likely, particularly with the election of Donald Trump and the momentum his administration generated.
Imagining, Caricaturing, and Countering Radicalization
While anti-Sharia bills circulated through state legislatures, the federal government was busy retooling and shoring up its counterterror strategy to respond to rising Muslim ''radicalization''------''the process by which an individual adopts an extremist ideology that is linked to terrorist activity.'' 131 Although not explicitly associated with Islam, the term has been discursively and politically linked to Muslims, 132 who are believed to subscribe to Sharia and are subsequently mobilized to carry forward a ''clash of civilizations'' with the U.S. 133 Thus, very clearly illustrating the kindred Islamophobic thread that links anti-Sharia legislation with CVE Policing.
In practice, CVE Policing links radicalization------or propensity for radicalization------with Muslim identity. CVE is specifically focused on monitoring observant Muslim Americans, 134 particularly those transitioning from secular to devout lifestyles, members of the community holding ''critical politics, '' 135 or individuals who express their faith conspicuously. 136 In Policing ''Radicalization,'' Amna Akbar observes: Radicalization suggests that the path from Muslim to terrorist is a predictable one produced by or correlated with religious and politi- CVE Policing is not, in practice, concerned with other forms of radicalization or violent extremism. Rather, radicalization is functionally framed by DHS as a purely Muslim phenomenon 138 adding CVE Policing to the corpus of state surveillance and policing programs dedicated entirely to preventing and punishing Muslim threats------real and imagined.
CVE Policing enlists local law enforcement to work closely with Muslim communities to prevent the formation of radicalization among subjects, and if that fails, to preempt terrorist attacks.
139 Through recruitment of local Muslim informants and interlocutors from within the community, 140 counter-radicalization logic asserts that a prospective radical can be preempted with early intervention, and if not, prevented from taking action after a subject has been radicalized. 141 In line with formative radicalization and counter-radicalization theory, CVE Policing frames radicalization, which it defines as ''an identifiable and predictable process by which a Muslim becomes a terrorist,'' as being broken down into four stages:
142 Therefore, the earlier the intervention by law enforcement and their proxies, CVE theory posits, the stronger the likelihood of curbing conspiracies to commit terror acts. 143 Thus, the definition of radicalization, though racially and religiously neutral, is disproportionately (if not exclusively) deployed against Muslim subjects. In 2014, pilot CVE programs extending federal policing tools to local law enforcement were implemented in Boston, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles. 144 These three cities are not only home to large Muslim American populations, but more specifically, indigent Muslim 137. Akbar, Policing ''Radicalization,'' supra note 131, at 811. 138. Id. at 827. 139. Id. at 833---34. 140. Id. at 861---62. In addition, informants also add legitimacy to CVE Policing by either express or tacit endorsement. If a respected figure, such as an Imam, takes on responsibility as interlocutor or informant, he not only sources law enforcement with invaluable and otherwise inaccessible information about a prospective target, but also stamps the policy with a seal of approval from an esteemed community figure. 141. Id. at 814---15. 142. Id. at 820. 143. Id. at 812. During the first, second, and third stages, suspicion of radicalization is linked mainly to religious expression, political activity, or both, which law enforcement suspects to be linked with radical activity. Here, no action has taken place, and constitutionally protected activity is being linked to (prospective) terrorism, and being chilled. Plans are underway to expand CVE Policing into more cities. 147 However, Muslim American opposition against CVE is gradually mounting, particularly as the program steeps itself further in pilot cities and steers its expansion into new ones------including Dearborn, 148 Detroit, where state surveillance to ''fight terrorism'' is an established practice, 149 and New York City. 150 Increasing opposition, spearheaded both by advocacy groups and grassroots efforts, is gradually beginning to address the distinct and grave civil liberties perils faced within poor Muslim American communities.
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Like the Naturalization Era ban on Muslims, AEDPA in 1996, or the PATRIOT Act, CVE Policing facilitates Islamophobia on the ground and, for many political candidates, creates political incentives for fearmongering, which ''endorses and emboldens the Islamophobic rhetoric among presidential hopefuls. '' 152 This illustrated very vividly, for the American and international audiences closely following the 2016 presidential campaign, the intimate nexus between the law and politics of American Islamophobia. 156 trenchantly unearths the early suspicion and fear of Islam held by American presidents, statesmen, key thinkers, and pundits. Indeed, these opinions were far more than merely political views. They were broad ideological frames spawned from the underlying and indelible system of Orientalism.
IV. THE POLITICS OF ISLAMOPHOBIA
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Narrowly identified as explicit bigotry, political Islamophobia is manifested both blatantly and latently. It can be detected easily from the bigoted and bellicose rhetoric, or unveiled by the political stimuli that push decisions or policy disparately targeting Muslims and Islam or disengaging from Muslim communities entirely. Section A examines the most vivid forms of blatant political Islamophobia, while Section B uncovers and investigates notable incidents that exhibit latent forms.
A. Blatant Political Animus
Framing Islam as a rival faith was a staple message coming from leading Republican presidential candidates.
158 Part and parcel of that baseline was the branding of Muslims as a suspicious, violent, and alien 154. Islamophobia is also a systemic, fluid and deeply politicized dialectic between the state and its polity: a dialectic whereby the former shapes, reshapes, and confirms popular views or attitudes about Islam and Muslim subjects inside and outside of America's borders. Therefore, the third [in addition to private and structural] dimension of Islamophobia focuses on ''dialectical Islamophobia,'' which is the process by which state policies legitimize prevailing misconceptions, misrepresentations and tropes widely held by private citizens. 172 which consequently exposed them to increased bigotry and violence from private actors.
Amid an upward spike of mosque arsons, 173 Trump stated, ''we're going to have no choice'' but to close some mosques. 174 Days later, he stood by his position that Muslims coming into the country should do far more than submit themselves to a registry, stating that ''[t]here should be a lot of systems, beyond databases. '' 175 In essence, he was advocating for a broader tracking system than the NSEERS Program enacted after 9/11, which was ultimately suspended in April 2011. Trump justified his proposal by invoking 9/11, stating that ''[i]t wasn't people from Sweden that blew up the World Trade Center. '' 176 Mirroring the unoriginality of underlying trope, Trump's statement itself was taken from Richard Cohen, who said the very same words one month after 9/11. the electorate. 185 Although more conspicuous among Republican presidential hopefuls, political Islamophobia was not exclusive to the Republican Party, but also a frequent theme in the explicit and latent messages of established democrats in office and on the campaign trail.
B. Un-Mosquing Islamophobia: Latent Political Animus
''America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles . . . . ' 188 His stop at the Islamic Society of Baltimore came seven years into his presidency. A span that encompassed the rise and fall of ''Arab Spring'' revolutions, 189 escalating bigotry toward Muslims, and a protracted war on terror that collaterally impacts America's eight million Muslim citizens. 190 The length of his avoidance of American mosques is made even more glaring when juxtaposed with his famous speech at Cairo's Al Azhar University, a global center of Islamic education and thought, delivered a year into his first term. 191 In Cairo, Obama openly challenged the ''clash of civilizations'' rhetoric and policies advanced by the Bush Administration. 192 His words helped mend the deep wounds inflicted by the War on Terror ''crusade'' on Muslims both stateside and abroad. 193 Following his Cairo speech,
Obama was celebrated by Muslims and Muslim Americans as a transformative leader who could undo the damage wrought by previous administrations and, in turn, reconcile tensions between Muslims and the United States. 194 However, the seven years between Obama's historic Cairo speech and his address to Muslim Americans in Baltimore witnessed the expansion of structural Islamophobia (with the formal establishment of CVE Policing) within his administration and the growing opposition it caused among Muslim Americans.
Critiqued by many Muslim Americans as long overdue, 195 President Obama's first presidential visit to an American mosque was highlighted by a speech that condemned Islamophobia. 196 But behind the words, a political mission drove it forward. Mirroring his own relationship with Islam and Islamophobia, defined primarily by allegations that he himself was an undercover Muslim, President Obama's engagement of the faith can be best characterized as strategic and intentionally distant.
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President Obama was feared to be a Muslim while campaigning for the presidency. Opponents, most notably Trump, called Obama a Muslim as a means to undermine his campaign, and deepen perceptions that he was a foreigner. 198 Perceptions that Obama is a Muslim continued into Obama's second term, illustrating that years-old allegations developed into widely held beliefs.
199 These beliefs had a considerable impact on Obama and confined his outreach and engagement with the Muslim American community. Specifically, they influenced him to keep political distance in order to retrench perception that he was a Muslim. 200 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 Political aversion to mosques, in President Obama's case, exhibits a less conspicuous brand of Islamophobia. 201 However, what circumstances prompted Obama------during the final quarter of his second term------to finally enter a mosque and speak to its congregation? The fact his visit took place during his second term, and at the close of his administration, meant that the political stakes were far lower.
The expansion of CVE Policing in the aftermath of the San Bernardino and Paris attacks, 202 which is sure to become more intense after the Orlando massacre, strongly suggests another motive, namely, the state's interest in enlisting Muslim Americans as strategic supporters of expanding counter-radicalization programming and CVE Policing. 203 211 reveals that the February 3, 2015 visit to the Baltimore mosque was a materially calculated presidential maneuver driven by fear. This time, instead of fearing the reputational or political damage a mosque visit would incur, President Obama pivoted------seven years later------to carry forward counterterror policies exclusively focused on Muslim American bodies and communities, policies rooted in a fear as old as the nation itself.
While the Republican Party, particularly with Trump's ascent, became the party of blatant and explicit political Islamophobia, the Democratic Party, under President Obama, stood as the party of expanding structural Islamophobic policy and programming. The latter of these parties mirrored Obama's masterful speech at the mosque in Baltimore and used benign and gracious language toward Muslims as a means to enlist them in programming that invites great dangers into Muslim American communities. Clark's assertion of the ''their'' versus ''our'' binary, although talking about American citizens in the case of Muslim Americans, manifests the clash of civilizations trope that undergirds American Islamophobia. 218 It is an emanation of the us versus them logic, or ''with us or against us'' rhetoric, 219 that characterized the War on Terror and the policies and programs that came to define it. After Clark's statements, however, the Clinton campaign did not publicly admonish them or release him from his ''campaign surrogate'' post. 220 As a result, this led many to believe that Clinton's nonfeasance amounted to tacit endorsement, or at minimum, a calculation that publicly condemning the idea of Muslim American internment would garner minimal political points but expose her to increased attack from Republican candidates. headlines about ''Muslims voting for a Jew'' the morning after the upset, 234 reinforcing the stereotype that Muslims are inherently at odds with Jews, and vice-versa. 235 Therefore, while Trump benefitted tremendously from delivering an Islamophobic message, Sanders' opposition to it also bore political fruit, garnering him votes and visible Muslim American leadership within his campaign. 236 Indeed, rising fear of Islamophobia------coming from the left and most profusely from the right------pushed Muslim Americans to the polls in record numbers.
Latent Islamophobia in the Presidential Campaign
237 ''Growing Islamophobia in America was ranked as the most important issue for Muslim voters, '' 238 and fear of continued and exacerbated injury, all too regular and familiar after 9/11, created the sense of urgency for an unprecedented degree of political involvement.
Skepticism of Clinton, and outright fear of Trump, remained prominent throughout the 2016 presidential election------particularly as the two emerged as the representatives of their respective parties------indicating that Muslim voters were forced to choose between the expansion of CVE Policing and ancillary programs with the Democratic nominee, and the possibility of bans and blatantly discriminatory surveillance programs under Trump. 239 Muslim Americans are caught between an intensifying Islamophobic climate and state expansion of counterterror strategies that disproportionately focus on them. 241 Fifteen years after 9/11, the extending tentacles of American Islamophobia are, perhaps like never before, ''haunt[ing] their ability to enjoy citizenship as a matter of rights.'' 242 Systematically framed as inassimilable, foreign, and threatening by politicians, and monolithically classified as criminally suspicious by the state, Muslim America ranks among the most misrepresented and maligned segments of the American polity. 243 This discursive ignorance, coupled with the escalating fear drummed up by political rhetoric and state policy, facilitates the hate crimes and violence inflicted on Muslim American subjects today.
Indeed, the blatant Islamophobia freely wielded by President Trump has emboldened a frightening degree of private Islamophobia in the U.S. Thus, political Islamophobia is in part a strategy to garner votes, particularly among disaffected segments of the electorate who take to bigoted and xenophobic messaging. 244 Whether intended or unintended, the hateful rhetoric emanating from the Republican Party, and even the latent fearmongering delivered by Democrats, has the effect of endorsing private Islamophobia and facilitating the spike in hate crimes against Muslim Americans unfolding today.
The convergence of structural and private Islamophobia inflicts enhanced injury upon Muslim American bodies, communities and geographies. Section A provides a snapshot of these injuries, while Section B assesses how injury and growing Muslim American concern impacted the 2016 presidential campaign, specifically in terms of mobilizing Muslim Americans to vote at a higher clip and against the candidates leading the political Islamophobic charge.
A. Words that Wound
Mirroring the post-9/11 moment, Islamophobia has ''cast [Muslims] as disloyal outsiders and noncitizens. '' 245 While citizens, the demonization of Islam and political and legal suspicion of Muslims has enabled the subordination of Muslim Americans. In turn, this deepens the secondclass citizenship of Muslim Americans, denying the ''enjoyment of rights'' that flow from ''social membership.'' 246 As articulated by leading immigration law scholar Linda Bosniak,
[Muslim Americans] may now enjoy nominal citizenship status, but their members are, in fact, afforded less in the way of substantive citizenship than others in society. 247 This denial, or diminishment, of ''substantive citizenship'' rights is enabled by the convergence of the legal and political Islamophobia illustrated above, 248 which sows the seeds for the rising incidence of hate and violence taking place on-the-ground today in America.
A number of recent events illustrate the frightening uptick in Islamophonic violence in America. For instance, the February 2015 attack on the Islamic School of Rhode Island, 249 the targeted arson of a Houston mosque days later, 250 the murder of three Muslim American students in Chapel Hill, 251 and the frightening range of armed and unarmed antiMuslim rallies, 252 are all evidence that Islamophobia is trumping the degree of anti-Muslim bigotry immediately after 9/11. While other forms of racial and religious animus continue to decline, according to FBI statistics, 2011 and the following years witnessed an ''intensification of antiMuslim rhetoric'' and violence. 253 Yet, ''aside from lofty rhetoric and a long-awaited visit to a US mosque, [President Obama has not institut-UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 The shift by American Muslims away from . . . the Republicans------is dramatic, and the truest example of a backlash we've seen. This is virtually unprecedented. '' 268 This political sea-change among Muslim American voters evidences how the marked rise in legal and political Islamophobia since 9/11 has triggered a commensurate shift in the voting allegiance of Muslim Americans. As illustrated above, endorsement of Islamophobic ideas or framings are hardly the exclusive dominion of Republicans. Surveillance of Muslim Americans has been expanded under President Obama, dubbed by many as ''the most liberal president ever,'' 269 and counterterrorism programs are infiltrating local Muslim American geographies in unprecedented ways.
However, delivery is the primary distinction between the Islamophobia advanced by Republican and Democratic figures, the latter of which disguise programs built upon the fear and suspicion of Muslims with the rhetoric of tolerance and inclusion. The former, as luridly exhibited by the bellicosity of Trump and the polemical framings of Cruz, rely on in-your-face bigotry. As past polls and surveys consistently demonstrate, 270 the cloaked form of Democratic Islamophobia is far more preferable to Muslim Americans than the brazen chorus pushing Muslim bans or disavowing the possibility of a Muslim president coming from the right.
Writing in the Washington Post, Petula Dvorak rang the alarm against the intensifying climate of American Islamophobia:
The tone is actually worse than it was after the Sept. 11 attacks on our own soil. Registration by religion? Sounds like Nazi Germany, not a country with a First Amendment that enshrines freedom of religion . . . . The rhetoric dominating our nation right now is anything but civil. It's time for all of us to put a stop to it.
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The call signals an emerging mainstream, non-Muslim front against Islamophobia which normalizes Muslim Americans as Americans, citizens deserving of constitutional protection, and indeed, as voters, whose political clout is expected to rise as the population steadily grows. Perhaps an influential and organized Muslim American political presence, more than any other mechanism, is the best line of defense against bombastic rhetoric, structural Islamophobia and escalating private violence. ''Sharia is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States.'' Herman Cain 273 Islamophobia occupied center stage in the 2016 presidential race, and reasserted itself firmly within present-day, national-security policy and programs. On the Republican Party side, bellicose rhetoric against Islam and Muslims has been front-and-center in candidate debates, television interviews, and voter rallies, ''explicitly challeng[ing] the notion that American Muslims deserve the same liberal notion of rights that other citizens enjoy.'' 274 Indeed, the brazen Islamophobia emanating from the campaign is emblematic of rising fear of Islam, and animus of Muslims. But it is not unfolding within a historical, legal, or political vacuum.
Neither new in form nor novel in substance, the fearmongering mobilized by Donald Trump and the collective suspicion of Muslims driving CVE Policing are extensions of old and embedded tropes, which root the American Islamophobia on display today. 275 They are modern emanations of an ideological campaign that prohibited Muslims from becoming naturalized citizens from 1790 through 1944, and political pronouncements that flatly viewed Islam as a ''warmongering faith'' bent on decimating American democracy. 276 These are views that have withstood the test of time and that are incessantly deployed to reestablish the trope that Islam is inherently antithetical to American democracy, and Muslims presumptively subversive and suspicious.
Islamophobia is neither political rhetoric nor law alone. Rather, it is a cogent system and dialectic whereby the popular and political bigotry espoused by reactionary figures is informed, endorsed, and emboldened by judicial rulings and state policy. It is comprised of a coherent set of tropes about Islam and Muslims, which framed and still frame how the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 state perceives the faith, polices Muslims beyond and within state bounds, and responds to the threat------either real or imagined------with the violent rhetoric of politicians jockeying for the highest seat in the land and the might of the state's national-security arms. While the hateful campaigning of politicians often trumps the less detectable suspicion of Islam and Muslims displayed on the left in terms of media coverage, both are forms of American Islamophobia that extend from legal and political roots planted centuries ago. Thus, unfolding American Islamophobia should not be framed as a break from American values and tradition. 277 Instead, it is a natural outgrowth of the fear and animus deeply rooted in a formative legal and political campaign, which seeded the pronounced Islamophobic imagination and religious profiling measures that prevail today.
Therefore, while the 2016 presidential race is broadly viewed as a moment marking the emergence of blatant and political Islamophobia, a more precise view is that it witnessed its full-fledged revelation and capitalization as an effective political tool. Islamlophobia is a legacy that pervades American history, and as the 2016 presidential race becomes part of that history, it will surely continue within the American political arena.
